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Nonprofit organizations play a critical role in efforts to conserve biodiversity. Their success in this regard will be determined in part by how 
 effectively individual nonprofits and the sector as a whole are structured. One of the most fundamental questions about an organization’s structure 
is how large it should be, with the logical counterpart being how concentrated the whole sector should be. We review empirical patterns in the size, 
concentration, and growth of over 1700 biodiversity-conservation nonprofits registered for tax purposes in the United States within the context 
of relevant economic theory. Conservation-nonprofit sizes vary by six to seven orders of magnitude and are positively skewed. Larger nonprofits 
access more revenue streams and hold more of their assets in land and buildings than smaller or midsized nonprofits do. The size of conservation 
nonprofits varies with the ecological focus of the organization, but the growth rates of nonprofits do not.
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through habitat management and restoration. They also 
take the lead in mobilizing public concern about biodiver-
sity through education and outreach. At state and national 
levels, nonprofits provide an important check and counter-
weight to public agencies and the political appointees who 
lead them, while also making up much of the shortfall in 
conservation spending by state and federal governments 
(Shaffer et al. 2002, Lerner et al. 2007, Fishburn et al. 2009). 
Internationally, nonprofits provide a conduit for chan-
neling funds for conservation from a donor base in more 
affluent countries to poorer nations where biodiversity is 
richest and most imperiled (Brooks et al. 2006, Halpern 
et al. 2006). In so doing, nonprofits take on a role that 
many national governments struggle to fulfill, and they 
offer greater flexibility than what is available to multilateral 
institutions.
Like the biodiversity it is charged to protect, the suite of 
organizations within the conservation-nonprofit sector is 
rich and diverse (Sutherland et al. 2009). However, given 
its central role in protecting biodiversity and the numer-
ous writings about the priorities on which conservation 
organizations should focus (Margules and Pressey 2000, 
Moilanen et al. 2009), surprisingly little is known about 
how the conservation-nonprofit sector is structured and 
how effectively it fulfills the many and varied responsibili-
ties it must bear.
The way in which an organization is structured determines how effectively it can allocate available resources to meet 
its objectives (Chandler 1990). The principle also extends 
to a collection of organizations; the way the collection is 
structured determines how effectively the summed actions 
of its constituent organizations allocate available resources. 
For example, the way in which an industry is configured 
determines how efficiently it will employ limited resources 
to meet societal demands for products—an issue that pro-
vides the rationale for antitrust laws (Scherer and Ross 1990, 
Cabral 2000).
These economic principles apply just as readily to 
 organizations active in biodiversity conservation as to 
 for-profit businesses in other sectors. Indeed, understand-
ing the implication of organization structure for conser-
vation effectiveness was recently identified as one of the 
scientific research topics with the greatest potential to 
improve the practice of biodiversity conservation globally 
(Sutherland et al. 2009). However, this topic has received 
very little study to date. In the present article, we discuss 
these ideas, focusing on the role played by nonprofit orga-
nizations (henceforth nonprofits) active in biodiversity 
conservation.
Nonprofits have critical roles to play in efforts to 
conserve biodiversity. Locally, these organizations take 
responsibility for on-the-ground delivery of conservation 
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In the present article, we discuss the relevance of theories 
of the firm from the field of industrial organization to non-
profits active in biodiversity conservation. We then review 
empirical patterns in the sizes, concentrations, and growth 
rates of nonprofits aiming to conserve different elements of 
biodiversity. The data we present are not sufficiently resolved 
to provide a direct test of some relevant economic theories. 
At the same time, the patterns that we observe suggest that 
certain lines of theoretical work may be more applicable 
than others to conservation nonprofits.
Three previous data analyses on US nonprofits provided 
important precursors and complements to the empirical 
data that we present. Czech and colleagues (1998) showed 
that, from a sample of 632 conservation nonprofits in 1996, 
a greater number of organizations were active in the conser-
vation of more-charismatic taxonomic groups. Albers and 
Ando (2003) examined 1211 land trusts in the United States 
in 1998 in a bid to determine whether state-level varia-
tion in the number of land trusts was efficient. Although 
it was groundbreaking, their analysis had some important 
shortcomings. First, they focused only on the number of 
land trusts and neglected the size variation. They also did 
not differentiate among land trusts on the basis of different 
conservation objectives and left out many other types of 
nonprofit active in biodiversity conservation. Finally, their 
predictions were static and lacked consideration of how 
nonprofits grow and evolve. The third study, by Straughan 
and Pollak (2008), presented more-comprehensive data on 
environmentally oriented nonprofits in the United States 
through 2005. Straughan and Pollak (2008) relied on the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics classification sys-
tem, the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), to 
identify nonprofits that emphasized environmental issues. 
This classification is too coarse to distinguish organiza-
tions active in biodiversity conservation; it categorizes them 
alongside others working on, for example, the advocacy of 
renewable-energy technologies and groups coordinating 
recycling programs.
Theoretical background
In this section, we describe theoretical background that could 
provide foundations for studying nonprofit organization.
Nonprofit size and concentration. We focus much of our dis-
cussion on one of the most basic decisions that nonprofits 
face—namely, how large they should be. Organization size 
is accepted to be the most “readily available statistical proxy 
for… administrative complexity” in studies of industrial 
organization (Chandler 1990, p. 15). Size-based questions 
are common to all conservation nonprofits. For example, 
managers face decisions about how many staff to hire, when 
to open new offices and programs, or whether to acquire 
and take on the management of new nature reserves. The 
size of a nonprofit is partly determined by how much of a 
given conservation target it tries to deliver (e.g., how many 
individuals of a focal species, how big a nature reserve to 
establish to protect a particular habitat type) as well as 
how many  different conservation targets it tries to pro-
tect (e.g., how many different species or habitat types). A 
nonprofit’s size also depends on how many conservation 
activities it  manages in house and how many it relies on 
partners to provide. For example, relevant decisions would 
be whether a national nonprofit should pass management 
responsibilities for a reserve to a local organization (Sutter 
et al. 2009), how large of an in-house science program a 
conservation nonprofit requires (Cleary 2006, Higgins et al. 
2006), or how involved a foundation should become in 
directing on-the-ground conservation efforts (Lehmer 1999, 
Delfin and Tang 2006).
When scaling up to a whole sector, the counterpart to dis-
cussions regarding the size of individual nonprofits concerns 
the optimal number and concentration of nonprofits. The 
concentration of nonprofits is a measure of how much of 
the overall responsibility for supplying conservation benefits 
falls on a handful of large organizations. Discussions regard-
ing when and how nonprofits should cooperate or compete 
with one another (Mace et al. 2000, Bode et al. 2011) can be 
viewed as being about the pros and cons of concentration 
of the nonprofit sector. Debates over whether the planning 
of conservation activities should be aggregated to larger 
spatial scales in order to internalize externalities (Erasmus 
et al. 1999, Rodrigues and Gaston 2002, Strange et al. 2006, 
Kark et al. 2009) or whether decentralized governance of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is preferable (Berkes 
2007, Somanathan et al. 2009) also provide a close analogue 
to nonprofit-sector-concentration discussions in public 
conservation policy.
Economic theories predicting the size and concentra-
tion of nonprofits are built from supply- and demand-side 
 considerations. On the supply side, theories of firm size in 
general, and of nonprofit size in particular (e.g., Lakdawalla 
and Philipson 2006), start from an assumption that the 
average cost of supplying a unit of output (here, a unit 
of biodiversity-conservation gain) is a U-shaped function 
of the overall quantity produced. The average-cost curve 
describes the minimum possible cost associated with a 
nonprofit delivering a given level of conservation benefit 
(figure 1). The average-cost curve comprises two elements: 
One (the dark gray curve in figure 1) includes the costs pri-
marily determined by the biophysical processes involved in 
supporting a particular element of biodiversity. These pure 
production costs of biodiversity will depend on the particu-
lar conservation target being prioritized. For example, if the 
nonprofit is trying to conserve genetic diversity within a 
focal species in situ, the size of the operation required might 
be set by the spatial scales over which local adaptation plays 
out, which will be very different for different species. In turn, 
this focus will generate a cost curve very different from one 
faced by an organization that aims, say, to conserve a func-
tioning wetland habitat. In general, pure production costs are 
assumed to decrease with nonprofit size initially (figure 1). 
For example, more hands-on management techniques are 
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departments or other business units. On the other hand, 
if an organization becomes too large, its ability to access 
information and to communicate it internally weakens, 
incentives faced by staff may diverge, and internal trans-
action costs increase (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Arrow 
1974, Williamson 2005). Although particular management 
structures exist to reduce such costs (e.g., multidivisional 
forms like the state chapters that make up The Nature 
Conservancy [TNC]), they cannot be avoided altogether. To 
date, organizational costs have been ignored in almost all 
studies in which the importance of accounting for costs in 
conservation planning was advocated (Naidoo et al. 2006, 
Wilson et al. 2009).
Instead, an entirely different set of costs have preoccupied 
conservation scientists (Margules and Pressey 2000, Naidoo 
and Iwamura 2007, Underwood et al. 2009, Wilson et al. 
2009, Fuller et al. 2010)—namely, those incurred if conser-
vation organizations fail to allocate the resources available 
to them effectively, given their existing organizational size 
and structure (e.g., determining whether more-cost-effective 
choices of sites exist than those currently being managed as 
nature reserves). Inefficiencies of this type are represented in 
figure 1 by nonprofits sitting somewhere above the average-
cost curve (point A), which, when other factors are ignored, 
suggests missed cost savings of a size indicated by the length 
of the vertical arrow.
A simple recommendation regarding nonprofit size might 
be that, as well as aiming to be configured internally in such 
a way as to hit the average-cost curve, nonprofits should 
aim to be of such a size that they hit this curve at or near 
its minimum point (the minimum efficient scale, point B 
in figure 1). At this point, a nonprofit achieves the greatest 
bang for its buck in terms of conservation gain delivered 
per dollar spent. When competitive, for-profit industries 
are studied, a common prediction in theories of firm size is 
that firms will be located at or near their minimum efficient 
scale (Scherer and Ross 1990). However, the outcome for 
nonprofit sectors is less clear, because competition between 
nonprofits may not be as intense and may not respond as 
closely to the cost effectiveness of production (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972).
Demand-side considerations also need to be taken into 
account when considering the structure of nonprofit  sectors. 
Existing models are focused on nonprofits competing for 
support from a limited donor base by seeking to match 
their activities to donors’ priorities in order to attract fund-
ing (Economides and Rose-Ackerman 1993, Bilodeau and 
Slivinski 1997, Aldashev and Verdier 2010). In biodiversity 
conservation, this may mean that nonprofits will site their 
activities in locations that are most highly valued by donors 
(Ando and Shah 2010) or will prioritize taxa, ecosystems, or 
threats in which donors are particularly interested (Czech 
et al. 1998).
The closest analogy in industrial-organization theory to 
nonprofit sectors is widely held to be monopolistic com-
petition (Economides and Rose-Ackerman 1993, Aldashev 
needed in order to maintain species in postage-stamp-size 
reserves than in larger and more-functional habitat frag-
ments (Armsworth et al. 2011). Eventually, the pure produc-
tion costs of protecting another unit of biodiversity could 
increase again, after all low-hanging fruit have been picked 
and only the most difficult conservation targets remain to be 
tackled (figure 1; Ando et al. 1998).
The second cost component (the light gray curve in 
figure 1) is determined by the internal limitations of the 
organization itself. Once again, by increasing in size, very 
small organizations can operate more cost effectively, by 
allowing staff to specialize and, for instance, by being able 





























Figure 1. Theoretical relationship between the amount 
of conservation activity undertaken by a biodiversity-
conservation nonprofit (a measure of nonprofit size) and 
the average cost per unit of biodiversity improvement 
produced when the nonprofit is configured efficiently 
given its current size. This average-cost curve comprises 
two parts. First, there are pure production costs due to 
spatial economies of scale in the underlying ecological 
production function and due to fixed costs of conservation 
being averaged over an increasing amount of conservation 
gain. Second, there are organizational costs—the costs 
involved in running an organization that can deliver on 
these improvements in biodiversity. Organizational costs 
are characterized by larger organizations’ being able to 
exploit efficiency savings by allowing staff to specialize 
in particular tasks but are also characterized by rising 
internal transaction costs. Point A represents a nonprofit 
that is not configured effectively given its size. The arrow 
indicates the cost component commonly focused on in 
conservation-planning studies. Point B marks the point 
of lowest average cost or the minimum efficient scale for 
the organization. Point C signifies a position at which 
the nonprofit is operating on the average-cost curve but 
at which the nonprofit is smaller in size than what is 
suggested by the minimum efficient scale.
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and Verdier 2010), in which businesses compete to supply 
related but differentiated products. With a monopolistic-
 competition model, the supply-side story at which one might 
arrive by studying cost functions for individual nonprofits—
namely, that individual firms should aim to be at their mini-
mum efficient scale—may not describe the actual, or even 
the desirable, behavior of the conservation-nonprofit sector 
as a whole. With free entry into the nonprofit sector, monop-
olistic competition could lead to a situation in which non-
profits occupy a position more like point C in figure 1, where 
the industry supports a larger number of more- specialized 
nonprofits than is dictated by the minimum efficient scales 
of biodiversity production (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997). 
In this situation, reallocating responsibilities for conserv-
ing biodiversity to a smaller number of larger nonprofits 
could reduce the overall costs of conservation. However, 
having more small nonprofits than would be cost effective 
may actually prove to be a more socially desirable outcome, 
because any consideration of sector-wide efficiency must 
also include the benefits of supporting a diversity of non-
profits (Cabral 2000). Maintaining a greater number of dif-
ferentiated nonprofits could increase the overall amount of 
resources available to support conservation by matching the 
heterogeneous demands of donors more closely (Bilodeau 
and Slivinski 1997, Aldashev and Verdier 2010, Ando and 
Shah 2010). The ability of a diversity of nonprofits to meet 
more closely the heterogeneous demands for public goods 
is touted as one of their key advantages over government 
provision (Weisbrod 1986, James 1990).
Donors would somehow have to tie donations closely 
to the efficient production of a unit of conservation gain 
in order for the competition among nonprofits for limited 
donor support to lead them toward the average-cost curve 
(and either point B or point C on it). Current initiatives 
within the nonprofit sector are intended to allow donors 
to reward the cost effectiveness of provision by nonprofits 
(Ozdemir et al. 2010) but are limited by the challenges 
involved in measuring a unit of output—particularly for 
organizations with less “tangible” goals (e.g., policy advo-
cacy; 6 and Forder 1996). However, for this approach to 
work, it would also require that donors’ choices reflect 
a desire to maximize the unit improvement per dollar 
donated in some aspect of biodiversity. Some writings on 
nonprofits suggest instead that donors are actually purchas-
ing personal satisfaction from the act of donating to some 
public good rather than seeking to purchase improvements 
in the good itself (Andreoni 1989, Kahneman and Knetsch 
1992), which could mean they have a reduced incentive to 
identify efficient providers of the public good to which to 
donate.
The growth of nonprofits. A distinct body of theory is focused 
on the growth of nonprofits, and size and concentration 
are viewed as outcomes of a growth process. There is a 
compelling argument for basing any theory of conservation 
nonprofits on patterns of growth, because environmental 
nonprofits constitute one of the fastest-growing nonprofit 
sectors in the United States while still being one of the small-
est nonprofit sectors (Blackwood et al. 2008).
Growth theories start from an assumption not of effi-
ciency and competition as driving industry structure but 
rather from a null model that the observed patterns are the 
outcomes of chance events alone. An important null model 
of industry growth was suggested by Gibrat in his hypoth-
esis that the growth rate of firms was independent of their 
size (Sutton 1997). This growth dynamic would lead to the 
distribution of firm sizes within an industry converging to a 
log-normal distribution through time. Indeed, many growth 
processes converge to broadly similar, positively skewed dis-
tributions (Ijiri and Simon 1977). The distributions of firms 
from many sectors, including nonprofits (Wilding et al. 
2004, Blackwood et al. 2008, Brockington and Scholfield 
2010), have proven to be strongly positively skewed, with a 
few very large firms responsible for the lion’s share of activity 
(Scherer and Ross 1990).
There have been attempts to unify stochastic-growth 
theories with efficiency considerations. For example, in 
the Jovanovic model, a process is assumed by which new 
entrants gradually learn the scales over which they can oper-
ate efficiently (Jovanovic 1982). The model predicts that new 
entrants will have higher exit rates than incumbents, but if 
they survive, they will have faster growth rates. Harrison and 
Laincz (2008) applied the Jovanovic growth model to the US 
nonprofit sector and used it to highlight the high net-entry 
(entry-minus-exit) rates of environmental nonprofits.
Empirical observations
An assessment of how effectively the conservation-nonprofit 
sector is structured is beyond the reach of a single study. 
As a first and necessary step in this direction, we sought 
to describe the current configuration of the biodiversity-
conservation-nonprofit sector in the United States. We built 
a data set detailing attributes of the nonprofits active in bio-
diversity conservation and registered for tax purposes within 
the United States. We used a searchable database (GuideStar, 
www.guidestar.org) of the annual tax returns of nonprofits 
with an annual grant income of over $5000. The data are 
based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 forms, which 
are required from nonprofits with an annual revenue of over 
$25,000. Taken together, these conditions mean that we will 
miss the very smallest nonprofits. The database was initially 
accessed between October 2006 and July 2007. Additional 
data were collected from the database in 2009 for a subset 
of the original sample. The financial records obtained cover 
the period of 2004–2007, with some minor variation in the 
precise dates covered, because of organizations’ accounts’ 
being reported for slightly different financial years.
To construct the full data set, we made an initial list of 
 candidate nonprofits for inclusion using the NTEE sys-
tem and combined this with keyword searches to identify 
 additional nonprofits not included in the relevant NTEE 
categories (see Straughan and Pollak 2008 for a related 
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discussion). We then filtered this list to retain only those 
nonprofits with a strong focus on biodiversity conserva-
tion in their mission statements or that reported major 
recent programs in biodiversity conservation. We did this by 
examining the public benefits reported by the organizations 
to justify their tax-exempt status and, where necessary, by 
 referring to the organizations’ Web sites for further clarifi-
cation. We eliminated a small number of nonprofits whose 
financial records were incomplete in the database. The final 
sample comprised 1743 organizations. Our data set is not 
comprehensive and should be considered a sample, albeit 
one that is much larger than those considered in previous 
studies on biodiversity-conservation nonprofits (Czech et al. 
1998, Albers and Ando 2003, Brockington and Scholfield 
2010).
In an important advance over previous studies, we recorded 
the particular biodiversity-conservation focus reported by 
each organization (table 1). We classified organizations 
based on where they try to conserve biodiversity, including 
both the spatial extent of their conservation objectives and 
whether they work in terrestrial, marine, or freshwater eco-
systems; how they try to conserve biodiversity (ex situ versus 
in situ methods); and what elements of the biota they focus 
on, which differentiates nonprofits focused on the conserva-
tion of animals or plants, vertebrates or invertebrates, and 
particular taxonomic classes for which there was sufficient 
replication to allow a comparison (mammals, birds, fish, 
reptiles). When it was possible, nonprofits were assigned to 
one of the discrete categories shown in table 1 on the basis of 
their mission statement and the description of their conser-
vation programs. When an organization had programs that 
could be classified in two or more bins, we included them 
in a separate category. The one exception to this rule is that 
we combined nonprofits with specific programs in inverte-
brate conservation but not vertebrate conservation (n = 8) 
with those having specific programs targeting both groups 
(n = 11) to maintain an adequate sample size for statistical 
analyses. The more resolved the conservation focus was, the 
smaller the sample sizes involved were (table 1).
There are many ways to measure the size of an organi-
zation. We did so using the assets held by the nonprofit 
(which includes land and buildings, as well as endow-
ments) and the annual flow of revenue into the orga-
nization (which includes membership dues, donations, 
government grants, and interest on endowments). When 
reporting their assets and revenues, the organizations are 
required by the IRS to combine amounts from within and 
outside the United States. We converted all amounts to 
2007 equivalents in US dollars, using the Consumer Price 
Index (www.bls.gov/CPI).
As well as reporting on the size and growth of individual 
organizations, we also examined the degree of concentra-
tion in the sector. We rely on a commonly used statistic to 
summarize the concentration of a particular industry called 
the C4 ratio, which measures the percentage of the overall 
sector accounted for by the four largest firms (Scherer and 
Ross 1990). For comparison, we also report the propor-
tion of assets and revenue managed by the largest 5% of 
organizations.
For three specific questions, we subsampled nonprof-
its from the full data set. To determine how the business 
models followed by nonprofits of different sizes varied, we 
examined more detailed, itemized tax returns for a strati-
fied random sample of 30 small, medium, and large non-
profits. We found the 200 smallest nonprofits as measured 
by assets and revenues and sampled 30 at random from 
the intersection of these sets. We repeated this procedure 
for 200 nonprofits surrounding the median-size and larg-
est organizations. We determined the proportion of assets 
held by each nonprofit in this subsample as financial assets 
(e.g., cash endowments) versus physical assets (land and 
buildings) and the number of different revenue sources 
obtained by the nonprofits identified on the IRS 990 
form (e.g., gifts and grants, membership dues, interest on 
endowments, sales of inventory).
To examine the growth patterns of nonprofits and whether 
the relative sizes of nonprofits are consistent through time, 
we randomly sampled a subset of 100 nonprofits for which 
we collected data on assets and revenue from 2004 through 
2007. The growth rates of these nonprofits were not nor-
mally distributed, and we relied on nonparametric statistics 
to analyze them.
To test whether the growth rates of nonprofits varied with 
their conservation focus, we randomly sampled nonprofits 
with programs focused on a particular element of biodiver-
sity (e.g., marine conservation) for which an annual growth 
rate could be estimated for the period of 2004–2007 until 
a balanced design was obtained for each area of activity. In 
most cases, 20 nonprofits were selected per category (e.g., 
20 focused on marine conservation, 20 on freshwater con-
servation, 20 on both), with the exception of the vertebrate–
invertebrate distinction and different taxonomic classes, 
where only 10 were collated because of the small number of 
organizations within these classifications.
Variation in the size of individual nonprofits. Our sample of 
1743 nonprofits active in biodiversity conservation managed 
combined assets worth $19.1 billion and annual revenues 
totaling $6.32 billion in the first reporting year covered by 
the data (2004). The median-size nonprofit had assets worth 
$0.74 million and an annual revenue of $0.52 million.
Nonprofit size varied by six or seven orders of magnitude 
when it was measured by revenue or assets, respectively, 
ranging from a few hundred or thousand dollars to bil-
lions of dollars (figure 2). This size variation demonstrates 
the limitations of studying the biodiversity-conservation-
 nonprofit sector using only the number of nonprofits 
(Czech et al. 1998, Albers and Ando 2003). Restricting our 
attention to a randomly sampled subset of 100 nonprofits 
for which we collected data spanning four years and cor-
relating organization size at the start and end of this time 
period revealed that the relative sizes of the nonprofits were 
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The distribution of nonprofit sizes, based on assets, did 
not differ significantly from log-normal (Anderson–Darling 
normality test, A = 0.6304, p > .05). The distribution of 
sizes based on revenue, however, differed significantly from 
 log-normal, even after we accounted for heavy tails by 
removing the 10 largest and 10 smallest organizations from 
the data set (A = 1.5621, p < .001). As one would expect, the 
two measures of nonprofit size (assets and revenue) were 
strongly correlated (Spearman’s rank correlation rs = .81, 
p < .001, n = 1743; figure 2).
By comparing a stratified sample of large, medium, and 
small nonprofits, we found that the business model fol-
lowed by nonprofits and the opportunities available to them 
depend on their size. The larger nonprofits in our study 
held on average 55% of their overall assets in land or other 
physical capital, whereas the corresponding percentages for 
small- and medium-size nonprofits were just 0% and 6%, 
respectively, with these organizations being significantly 
consistent through time (assets, Pearson’s r = .93, p < .001, 
n = 100; revenue, r = .74, p < .001, n = 100).
Although the large majority of the studied nonprofits 
were small- to medium-size operations, a few control a 
disproportionate share of overall conservation financing. 
The C4 ratio of nonprofits in our sample was 33% when 
it was measured by assets and 24% when it was measured 
by revenue. By way of comparison, for-profit sectors are 
characterized by a range of concentration patterns; some 
appear much more concentrated than this and others much 
less so (Scherer and Ross 1990). Among the conservation 
nonprofits, one organization alone—TNC—controls more 
than 25% and 16% of overall assets and revenues, respec-
tively. To put that into context, TNC has an annual revenue 
that exceeds the gross national income of some countries 
while still representing only a small fraction (0.3%–6.6%) 
of the annual revenue enjoyed by a Global Fortune 500 
company.
Table 1. Classification of biodiversity-conservation nonprofits based on their conservation focus and indices of 














held by the  
biggest four
Percentage  
held by  
top 5%
Percentage  
held by the  
biggest four
Percentage 
held by  
top 5%
Geography 1481 Intrastate 889 18.3 63.4 16.7 56.3
state 178 49.5 64.6 37.4 50.7
Interstate 162 47.2 59.5 34.4 47.7
united states 68 66.0 58.7 57.9 48.0
International 184 77.3 88.2 58.5 75.8
Realm 1383 terrestrial (t) 692 34.3 68.0 30.7 60.8
Freshwater (F) 55 66.3 60.8 38.0 30.8
marine (m) 68 79.0 74.1 58.1 51.0
tF 405 41.2 69.24 35.8 61.6
tm 66 84.2 71.0 73.5 63.2
Fm 21 91.8 68.6 85.4 68.2
tFm 76 89.4 89.4 81.0 81.0
Conservation  
situation
1018 Ex situ 240 41.0 62.5 33.3 52.6
In situ 744 52.7 79.7 46.4 74.4
both 34 85.2 56.0 84.7 56.0
Kingdom 580 animal 436 35.5 72.0 25.9 66.9
Plant 92 69.7 73.2 46.9 50.6
both 52 60.7 52.5 58.6 51.5
vertebrate status 331 vertebrate 312 40.6 74.4 36.7 73.1
Invertebrate  
or both
19 95.2 67.3 87.3 38.6
taxonomic class 290 mammals 76 73.3 73.3 68.6 68.6
birds 91 67.8 70.9 75.8 77.3
Fish 83 76.2 78.8 67.6 70.5
Reptiles 11 92.6 60.8 85.3 48.4
mammals  
and birds
14 97.5 55.9 96.7 61.0
mammals  
and fish
15 87.1 34.8 75.4 30.9
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more reliant on their financial assets (Kruskal–Wallis test, 
H(2) = 24.3, p < .001). Revenue streams were also better 
diversified for larger nonprofits; larger nonprofits accessed 
more than twice as many sources of revenue as did small 
nonprofits and 30% more revenue sources than medium-
size nonprofits (H(2) = 40.4, p < .001).
Variation in nonprofit size with conservation focus. In previous 
studies, it has been hypothesized that the size of conserva-
tion nonprofits will vary with their ecological focus. For 
example, Albers and Ando (2003) suggested that there 
could be taxonomic signals in organization size, because 
some groups of organisms would require more-coordinated 
conservation activity and may also attract greater donor 
support. Here, we tested whether such a systematic pattern 
exists, using all of the nonprofits in our sample that could be 
suitably classified (table 1).
The nonprofits whose mission and programs were broader 
in scope (i.e., they tried to provide more different types of 
conservation benefit) tended to be larger. For example, 
nonprofits active in terrestrial, marine, and freshwater con-
servation were nearly three times the size of those focused 
on just one realm (figure 3b). Similarly, organizations with 
specific programs protecting the needs of both animal and 
plant species had assets that were two to three times the size 
of those specializing in the conservation of only one king-
dom ( figure 3d). The same was true when the geographic 
focus of a nonprofit was analyzed. Nonprofits with a larger 
geographic reach (national or international) tended to be 
bigger—a pattern that was clearer when it was measured 
by revenues rather than assets, with revenues to national 
and international nonprofits being two to three times those 
received by organizations in the other categories (figure 3a).
Nonprofits that attempted to conserve biodiversity using 
ex situ methods were almost twice the size of those run-
ning in situ conservation programs (figure 3c). The biggest 
nonprofits active in ex situ conservation included zoos and 
aquaria, which operate substantial estates in or near metro-
politan areas. The operation of these facilities may impose 
particular average-cost structures (figure 1) that could 
explain the larger size of these organizations.
Although the resolution of the data limits what we can 
test, we found no evidence that the taxonomic focus of 
conservation nonprofits influences their size. Specifically, 
there were no significant differences in the size of nonprofits 
between those seeking to conserve animals and those seeking 
to conserve plants (figure 3d), between those seeking to con-
serve vertebrates and those seeking to conserve invertebrates 
(figure 3e), or among those seeking to conserve different 
taxonomic classes (figure 3f).
A final point of interest is that the nonprofits active in 
freshwater conservation were less than half the size of those 
working in marine or terrestrial systems ( figure 3b). This size 
difference warrants further exploration to assess (a) whether 
organizations focused on freshwater conservation can operate 
more effectively at smaller sizes; (b) whether the growth or 
consolidation of nonprofits focused on freshwater biodiversity 
would allow more biodiversity to be protected per dollar spent; 
or, alternatively, (c) whether less cooperation and consolidation 
of organizations focused on terrestrial and marine conservation 
would offer efficiency savings.
Concentration of nonprofits with conservation focus. How con-
centrated one would conclude biodiversity-conservation 
nonprofits to be depends on how narrowly one defines 
the focal sector. For instance, examining the C4 ratios for 
organizations working internationally (a focus of many 
conservation debates—e.g., Mace et al. 2000, Myers et al. 
2000, Halpern et al. 2006), one would conclude that the sec-
tor appears to be relatively concentrated (table 1). But if one 
focuses on the many organizations that work at more-local 
scales, then one would conclude the sector is quite diffusely 
distributed. Similarly, a focus on terrestrial biodiversity con-
servation would only lead to the conclusion that the sector 
is less concentrated than if one looks at organizations that 
work in freshwater or marine environments (table 1).
In estimating the degree of industry concentration, 
C4 ratios respond to the size and number of organizations 
operating in the defined sector. However, the relationship is 
not simple. For example, the subset of conservation non-
profits focused on in situ conservation appears more con-
centrated than those adopting ex situ approaches, despite 
the organizations pursuing in situ conservation’s being more 
numerous and smaller in size on average.
The amount of the sector accounted for by a fixed per-















Figure 2. Asset holdings and annual revenues of nonprofits 
active in biodiversity conservation that are registered for 
tax purposes within the United States (in millions of 2007 
US dollars).
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rate in assets and revenue across 
the four-year period and tested 
whether this was significantly 
greater than zero. The median 
annual growth rate of non profits 
based on assets was 6.6% and 
based on revenue was 4.4%, after 
controlling for inflation. However, 
only growth in assets was signifi-
cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
V = 3610, p < .001, n = 100).
Variation in the growth rates of 
non profits. When examining 
variation in growth rates across 
organizations, we first tested 
Gibrat’s hypothesis that growth 
rates are independent of firm 
size. We compared the growth 
rates of organizations between 
year three and year four against 
the size of the organizations in 
year one. Growth rate was not 
related to organization size for 
assets or revenue, which is con-
sistent with Gibrat’s hypothesis 
(Spearman’s rank-order correla-
tion for assets, rs = –.01, p = .91, 
n = 100; for revenue, rs = –.01, 
p = .96, n = 100). Second, we 
assessed the relationship between 
growth rate and organization age, 
because one might expect growth 
rates to slow down for older 
organizations as they mature and 
achieve a larger size, thereby con-
tradicting Gibrat’s hypothesis. 
Again, however, rank correlations 
revealed no significant relation-
ship for assets or revenue (assets, 
rs = .01, p = .91, n = 100; revenue, 
rs = .06, p = .55, n = 100).
From other work, we have additional data available on 
the growth of the largest nonprofit active in biodiversity 
 conservation, TNC, over a 40-year period (Fishburn et al. 
2009, Davies et al. 2010). We assume that after correc-
tion for inflation, TNC’s overall expenditure on land 
acquisition in the coterminous United States serves as 
an adequate indicator of the organization’s size between 
1960 and 2003. TNC grew in size by a factor of 10 during 
this period. We examined the growth of TNC over time 
with linear regression. To maintain statistical indepen-
dence, we performed a regression analysis on the growth 
rate between nonoverlapping pairs of years (e.g., 1960 
and 1961, 1962 and 1963) as a function of time. We found 
no directional change in growth rate over time (linear 
table 1) provides an alternative indicator of the contribution 
of organization size to concentration profiles, one that con-
trols for the number of nonprofits. Generally, the variation 
in concentration levels with conservation focus appears 
more moderate with this measure than is suggested by C4 
ratios. In some instances (e.g., when classifying organiza-
tions by where they do work), similar conclusions are drawn 
using both indicators, but in others (e.g., when classifying on 
the basis of an organization’s taxonomic focus), very differ-
ent conclusions about concentration profiles result.
Growth rates of nonprofits. We examined growth trends in 
 conservation nonprofits by focusing on a subsample of 
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Figure 3. Size variation of nonprofits active in biodiversity conservation as a function 
of their conservation focus and as measured by their asset holdings (white bars, roman 
characters) and annual revenues (gray bars, Greek characters), both log-transformed, in 
2007 US dollars. The error bars represent two standard-error units. The organizations 
have been grouped on the basis of where they try to conserve biodiversity, including 
both (a) the spatial extent of their conservation objectives and (b) whether they work in 
terrestrial, marine, or freshwater ecosystems; (c) how they try to conserve biodiversity 
(ex situ, in situ, or a combination of these two approaches); and what aspect of 
biodiversity they aim to conserve in terms of (d) animals or plants, (e) vertebrates or 
invertebrates, and (f) different taxonomic classes with sufficient replication to allow a 
comparison. The mean sizes marked with the same letter do not differ significantly from 
one another (Tukey’s honestly significant difference test, p > .05). Abbreviations:  
F, freshwater; Internat., International; Interst., interstate; Intrast., intrastate; M, marine; 
Mam., mammal; Rep., reptile; T, terrestrial; US, United States.
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curve) and is configured in a way that allows it to operate 
at its minimum efficient scale (point B in figure 1). Where 
this minimum efficient scale lies will likely vary with the 
 conservation objectives of nonprofits, depending on the 
ecological and evolutionary processes involved. We sought 
evidence for such a relationship by testing for systematic 
variation in nonprofit size with an organization’s conser-
vation focus. Some interesting patterns emerged that war-
rant further examination. In particular, nonprofits focused 
on conserving freshwater ecosystems were found to be 
less than half the size of those working on terrestrial or 
marine conservation, but we found no evidence for some 
patterns hypothesized in the literature. For example, there 
was no evidence of a taxonomic signal in organization size. 
However, the number of taxa that we can consider is limited 
by the more obvious signal in the data—namely, that large-
bodied, charismatic vertebrates attract most attention from 
nonprofits (Czech et al. 1998). Our ability to reveal such 
patterns is also limited by the resolution of the data on a 
nonprofit’s activities that is consistently reported on IRS 990 
forms, something that becomes apparent if we try to resolve 
the taxonomic focus of organizations further (to orders, 
families, genera, or species).
From the perspective of a policymaker, the relevant ques-
tion is whether the conservation-nonprofit sector as a whole 
is structured efficiently. Although the nonprofit sector is a 
bottom-up movement, policymakers exercise considerable 
influence over it and are in no sense stuck with what they 
get. Ultimately, governments define the operating condi-
tions for nonprofits through the tax code. Any revisions to 
its terms (e.g., regarding how societal benefits are defined 
or measured) would reverberate through the sector. Some 
authors have even called for increased application of anti-
trust laws to the nonprofit sector (Philipson and Posner 
2009). In the United States, public agencies are often crucial 
partners to conservation nonprofits through their grant 
awards (Straughan and Pollak 2008) and cost sharing on 
particular conservation activities (Sutter et al. 2009). This 
close interdependence of biodiversity-conservation non-
profits and public agencies is such that policymakers exer-
cise considerable influence over how the sector operates. 
Eschenfelder (2011) described a case study from a different 
nonprofit sector (social welfare) that illustrates how a gov-
ernment agency influenced nonprofits’ entrance decisions 
and decisions over whether and how to integrate to form a 
larger, consolidated organization.
The concentration profile of conservation nonprofits is 
no more acute than that observed in many other sectors 
(Scherer and Ross 1990). However, the degree of concen-
tration is such that the increase in coordination across 
the conservation sector that some authors have advocated 
(Mace et al. 2000) should be achievable. For example, if 
more cooperation in international conservation efforts is the 
goal, most of the sector would be impacted just by a further 
increase in collaboration among the four largest organiza-
tions involved (table 1).
regression, r 2 = .02, p = .51, n = 22), which also supports 
Gibrat’s hypothesis.
Finally, we tested for systematic variation in nonprofit 
growth rates with their conservation focus. We used a 
Kruskal–Wallis test to determine whether the focus of 
an organization influenced its growth rate. The only sig-
nificant variation occurred in the growth of assets held by 
organizations pursuing ex situ conservation approaches, 
in situ approaches, or a combination of the two (H(2) = 6.7, 
p = .03), where growth was marginally faster for organiza-
tions pursuing both in situ and ex situ strategies than for 
other organizations (Tukey’s honestly significant difference 
test, p < .06).
Conclusions
Understanding how the structure of conservation non-
profits influences their effectiveness in improving the 
plight of biodiversity has been identified as a priority 
research topic of importance to global biodiversity con-
servation (Sutherland et al. 2009). As a first step toward 
answering this question, we reviewed relevant economic 
theory as it would apply to conservation nonprofits. We 
then described current patterns in the size, growth, and 
concentration of conservation nonprofits in the United 
States. These empirical patterns do not yet suggest ways 
to improve the effectiveness of the conservation-nonprofit 
sector. However, any discussion of how conservation could 
be made more effective must begin from a description of 
how the sector is currently arranged. Following accepted 
practice in industrial organization, we used nonprofit size 
as a proxy for the complexity of organization structure 
(Chandler 1990). To justify this choice, we showed that 
conservation nonprofits of different sizes operate under 
different business models and have different opportunities 
available to them.
From the perspective of an individual nonprofit, the rel-
evant issue raised by our work is whether the organization 
is currently structured in a way that will enable it to deliver 
improvements in biodiversity in a cost-effective manner. 
Available conservation-planning tools and writings are 
designed to help conservation nonprofits minimize inef-
ficiencies in resource allocation (represented by the vertical 
arrow in figure 1) while taking the size and structure of the 
nonprofit involved as given. We focused instead on whether 
an organization itself is configured in a way that will enable 
it to deliver on its individual conservation objectives cost 
effectively. Because organizational costs (the light gray area 
in figure 1) are typically ignored altogether in conservation-
planning studies, nonprofits and government agencies may 
find their resource-allocation decisions being criticized by 
scientists who have only considered the pure production 
cost of generating a unit gain in some biodiversity indicator 
(see the dark gray area in figure 1).
The cost of producing a unit improvement in biodiversity 
in figure 1 is minimized when the nonprofit both allocates 
available resources efficiently (when it is on the average-cost 
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statistical assistance; and Brian Loasby, Michael Bode, and 
James Sanchirico for helpful discussion.
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